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Executive Summary
At various times in Australia's recent history, the Commonwealth government has used the tax system to support its public health policy goals. Tax concessions cost the same as direct, budget subsidies but are less transparent and less scrutinised. This study breaks new ground by examining how the benefits of tax concessions for health expenditures, such as the rebate for private health insurance, have been distributed among taxpayer income groups in the four decades since 1960. It also shows for the first time the value of the tax relief arising from the Medicare levy surcharge for those with private health insurance.
Taxation reform over the last decade has emphasized removing special concessions from the tax system in order to improve equity, economic efficiency and transparency. The use of the tax system since 1997-98 to provide subsidies to the health insurance industry directly contradicts the thrust of the Government's tax reform agenda. The private health insurance industry now receives more budgetary assistance than provided to the mining, manufacturing and primary agricultural production industries combined.
One of the basic strengths of Australia's public health system is that universal access to free public hospitals and cover against specified medical costs have been financed substantially through progressive taxation. The present extent of public assistance to the health insurance industry significantly distorts this progressive pattern of health care financing. The current rebate for private health insurance has a direct annual cost that is likely to be around $2 billion or more. Based on taxation statistics, this study shows that tax concessions for health remain heavily skewed towards the affluent. For 1997-98, the latest year for which taxation statistics are available:
• around a half of the value of tax concessions for private health insurance went to the most well off third of taxpayers; and,
• less than a fifth of these concessions go to the one third of individuals in the lowest taxable income group.
According to taxation statistics, the income-tested rebate for health insurance was at least as regressive as the universal rebate existing in the early 1980s. The removal of the income test from January 1999 makes the current rebate even more inequitable. It is likely that well over a billion dollars of public money is underwriting the health care of Australia's richest individuals and families. Around a quarter of the tax subsidy may be spent on ancillary rather than hospital insurance.
This skewed distribution of incentives for private health insurance contrasts sharply with a wide range of evidence on the progressive distribution of direct public spending on health.
This study also shows that assistance to the health insurance industry through the tax system has been severely understated. On conventional definitions of 'tax expenditures', the exemption from the 1 per cent Medicare levy surcharge that is allowed for the privately insured should be included in official published estimates of tax expenditures. This study shows the exemption represents a tax expenditure of around $1.1 billion annually. This is a substantial additional tax prop to the private health insurance industry that has attracted virtually no comment because of its lack of transparency and its omission from the Treasury's annual Tax Expenditures Statement. The use of Commonwealth taxation powers to impose a discriminatory tax on individuals choosing not to purchase a commercial product is questionable, and sets a precedent for imposing discriminatory income taxes according to other dubious criteria.
One rationale put forward for the present policy of encouraging high-income earners to take out private health insurance is that they can afford to pay more for health care. The most effective and equitable way to increase the contribution of the rich to health care costs would be to abolish the exemption from the Medicare levy surcharge and channel the revenues into the public health system.
While encouraging private health insurance membership is said to take pressure off public hospitals, there is compelling evidence that the cost of the private health insurance rebate far exceeds any financial gains to public hospitals.
Public assistance for the private health insurance industry is at the expense of public health care. Public sector cutbacks over the last decade have produced queues in public hospitals and axing of public dental care services. Yet through the rebate for private health insurance, the Federal government now provides a large public subsidy for highincome earners to jump hospital queues, obtain cosmetic surgery and dental care, and pay for their gym club membership. Through the 30 per cent rebate for ancillary insurance the Commonwealth is now spending around $180 million each year funding dental services mainly for the affluent. As well as undermining the progressive financing of universal health care, the scheme is an ineffective and wasteful way of funding health care.
Current financial incentives for middle and high-income earners to take out private health insurance and abandon Medicare are a drain on the public purse and threaten the progressive principle underpinning Australia's public health care financing system. The private health insurance rebate should be abolished, particularly for ancillary insurance. By doing so, at least $2 billion of additional funding could be earmarked for improving access to medically-necessary hospital services, and public dental and allied health programs.
The Medicare levy surcharge is an untapped opportunity for expanding a progressive funding base for health care. Extending the Medicare levy surcharge to all high-income earners would further expand available revenues system for the public health care by around $1 billion, and whilst also enhancing the progressivity of health care financing.
Existing incentives for private health insurance also lack transparency about public support for private health funds. The above measures would also serve to bring the reality of the tax system into line with the rhetoric of tax reform, and improve accountability of government.
Introduction
At various times in Australia's recent history, the Commonwealth government has used the tax system to support its public health policy goals. Tax concessions to particular industries or groups of taxpayers cost the government the same as direct subsidies. However, the income distribution of these tax 'carrots' and 'sticks' has not previously been analysed. This study breaks new ground by examining how the benefits of tax concessions for health expenditures were distributed among taxpayer income groups in the four decades since 1960, and how this affects the progressivity of Australia's system of funding health care.
From July 1997, the Coalition Government introduced an income-tested tax rebate for private health insurance premiums. At the same time, middle-and high-income individuals or families who chose to self-insure or rely on Medicare were penalized through a 1 per cent Medicare levy surcharge. Soon after, this income-tested rebate was scrapped in favour of a 30 per cent rebate on private health insurance from January 1999. This was similar in character to the rebate in existence for around two years in the early 1980s, although unlike the earlier rebate, benefits can also be claimed directly through private health insurance funds.
Like the tax rebate for private health insurance operating briefly in 1981-82 and 1982-83 , the latest scheme is very costly to public revenue. When introduced, the scheme was costed at $1.09 billion in 1999-2000 (the first full year of its operation), rising to $1.36 billion by 2002-03 (Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee 1998). With population coverage reportedly rising sharply to around 40 per of the population (around 7.9 million members) in June 2000, the cost of the rebate has been substantially revised (Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee 2000). While the Government's latest estimate is $1.9 billion, and that by Duckett and Jackson (2000) $2.2 billion, some estimate the cost could reach $2.4 billion a year (Segal 2000) . This is more budgetary assistance than received by the mining, manufacturing and primary agricultural production industries combined (Duckett and Jackson 2000) . The exemption from the Medicare levy surcharge for those with insurance also represents tax assistance for the industry. The $0.9 billion Medicare benefit payments for private patients in public hospitals is a further public subsidy of the private health sector.
At the end of a decade in which fiscal constraints produced unprecedented 'queuing' at public hospitals (Deeble 1999) , and saw various public health programs abolished (Duckett and Agius 2000) , who benefits from this public largesse warrants careful scrutiny.
Evidence from surveys suggests that those purchasing health insurance are likely to be earning high incomes (Wilson 1999 ) (Schofield 1997 The tax expenditure concept needs first to be explained, and some related issues reviewed. In Section 2 the conceptual and practical issues surrounding estimates of tax expenditures are discussed and their implications analysed. Section 3 describes tax concessions for private hospital insurance and medical expenses over the last four decades, while the following section presents summary estimates of the distribution of tax rebates and deductions, for the lower, middle and upper third of taxpayers by income group between 1960-61 and 1997-98. Section 5 places this distributional analysis in the wider context of health system funding in Australia and discusses the efficacy and the equity of subsidizing private health insurance in order to inject new funds and produce savings for the public health system. The final section sets out the policy implications of the study findings.
What does 'tax expenditure' mean?
The concept
Tax expenditure reporting began in the late 1960s and was adopted in most industrialized countries during the 1980s (OECD 1996) . A tax expenditure is a departure from the generally accepted tax structure, which produces a favourable treatment of particular types of activities or taxpayers (OECD 1984) .
Tax expenditure estimates shed light on public policy because subsidies provided through tax concessions (such as for health insurance contributions and private medical expenditures) substitute for direct budget expenditures. Tax expenditure estimates are also of interest because the pattern of distribution of tax expenditures may be quite different from that of direct expenditures. Unlike direct subsidies, tax expenditures have also traditionally been subject to little scrutiny. As the OECD (1996) recently pointed out:
The concept of a tax expenditure was developed because accounting for the costs and benefits of tax measures is often less rigorous than for direct expenditures, despite the fact that a tax system can be used to achieve similar goals as those of public spending programmes. As governments increasingly broaden tax bases and lower tax rates, tax expenditure accounts have become an important tool in analyzing tax reform.
Tax reform in Australia in recent years has emphasized widening the tax base. Tax expenditures are viewed as economically inefficient because they narrow the tax base, thus requiring higher tax rates on the remaining base to replace the revenues forgone. A billion of revenue forgone through tax concessions such as for private health insurance raises the annual bill for each personal income taxpayer by around $100.
The benchmark tax structure
A number of conceptual issues arise from the problem of identifying what is a tax expenditure as distinct from a part of the benchmark tax structure. 1 The norm, or benchmark, may differ between countries and over time. Such differences in the benchmark for measuring tax expenditures include:
• how the tax base and tax-paying unit is defined;
• whether it is adjusted for inflation;
• what degree of integration between the corporate and individual taxation is considered desirable;
• which accounting period is appropriate;
• whether a realisation or accruals basis is used for assessment; and
• how tax penalties and negative tax expenditures are assessed.
The benchmark adopted by the Commonwealth Treasury for estimating Australia income tax expenditures is discussed in detail in Appendix A to its annual Tax Expenditure Statements (Commonwealth Treasury 1999).
There are also different approaches to measuring tax expenditures:
• the 'revenue gain';
• the 'outlay-equivalent'; or
• the 'revenue-forgone' approach.
These different approaches reflect different assumptions about taxpayer behaviour and the scope of the estimates, rather than differences in the underlying concept being measured (Butler and Smith 1992) . Of particular importance is that estimates using the revenue gain approach conventionally incorporate the effects of price and behavioural 1 The main conceptual issues arising in estimating tax expenditures are discussed more fully in Butler and Smith (1992, pp. 43-58) .
changes due to the tax concession, whereas those using the revenue forgone approach do not.
Behavioural responses
Most studies of tax expenditures in Australia use the 'revenue forgone' approach. For example, this is the approach taken in the historical series produced by Butler and Smith (1992) and is used for the Commonwealth Treasury's Tax Expenditures Statement (Commonwealth Treasury).
Such estimates gauge the magnitude of tax expenditures arising from a particular tax concession by reference only to the market for the particular commodity or activity in isolation. That is, they use what economists call a 'partial equilibrium' framework, which assumes a zero 'cross price elasticity of demand' between a commodity such as private health insurance and any other commodity (such as net medical expenses). It also ignores any product/factor market interactions or macroeconomic implications.
This means for example, that if a tax concession makes private health insurance cheaper, and this significantly affects taxpayers' claims for net medical expenses, the total revenue cost of the concession may be either over-or under-stated. The direction of bias depends on whether private health insurance is a substitute for, or a complement to, net medical expenses:
• If private health insurance membership goes with lower net medical expenses claims by taxpayers, thereby lowering the revenue cost of the tax concession for net medical expenses, the revenue cost of the private health insurance concession is overstated.
• If net medical expenses rise substantially when private health insurance becomes cheaper, that is, private health insurance and higher net medical spending claims are `complements', then the revenue cost of having a tax concession for insurance will be understated, as will the revenue saving from abolishing the concession.
For this reason, adding together the cost of various tax expenditures, such as for net medical rebates and private health insurance, may also result in inaccurate totals.
Likewise there may be price effects and consequential resource shifts arising from increasing funds to a particular area if key resources are in fixed supply. 2 For example, if certain health specialists are in short supply, increasing funding available for private health services will enable the private providers to pay more attractive packages, and thus draw specialists away from public health services or facilities. Privately insured patients then get better access to medical care than those without insurance, even if their medical needs are the same. At the same time, higher price paid for specialist services contribute to cost inflation in the health services sector.
The implications are that each tax expenditure item should be examined separately, unless these interactions can be measured and accounted for. Complex secondary price and resource allocative effects may influence the revenue cost of a tax expenditure, and interpretation of individual tax expenditure estimates should allow for significant complementarities or substitution effects with other tax privileged items.
Tax penalties
Another key issue in the present context is the treatment of tax penalties, such as the 1 per cent Medicare levy surcharge on uninsured high-income taxpayers. One approach is to treat all 'tax penalties' as a 'negative' tax expenditure, which can make the concept of tax expenditures somewhat absurd. For example, the penalty excise on leaded petrol was treated as a negative tax expenditure, of -$120 million in the 1997-98 Tax Expenditures Statement (Commonwealth Treasury 1999) . Following this approach, the Medicare levy surcharge would be viewed simply as a negative tax expenditure on taxpayers without health insurance, with a 'cost' equal to minus the revenue raised, that is -$72 million.
However, a more meaningful and consistent approach would be to define the Medicare levy surcharge on the uninsured as part of the benchmark income tax system. This is consistent with "the principle criterion of benchmark design [which] is that it should represent neutral taxation treatment of similarly placed activities or classes of taxpayers" (Commonwealth Treasury 1999, Appendix A). According to Treasury, a criterion used to identify tax expenditures in other OECD countries is that 'it provides assistance to a distinct class of taxpayer and could be replaced by a direct outlay'.
Exemption from the 1 per cent levy surcharge 'provides assistance to a distinct class of taxpayers' -that is, those with private health insurance. It clearly could be a substitute for a direct outlay. The surcharge should be included as part of the income tax benchmark so as to properly reflect the tax benefit to insured taxpayers that is afforded by exemption from the surcharge.
This approach would also ensure the tax concession granted high-income earners with health insurance -exemption from the Medicare levy surcharge -is treated consistently with the Medicare levy exemption for low-income earners and other groups, which Treasury does count as a tax expenditure.
This study estimates the value of the tax relief afforded by the exemption by calculating the per capita Medicare levy surcharge applying for those paying the surcharge in each taxable income group above $50,000 p.a. It is then assumed that the number of insured taxpayers benefiting from this tax relief is measured by the difference between the number of those paying the Medicare levy in each income group, and those already paying the surcharge in each income group (ATO (1999)).
The value of the tax expenditure is the sum of the per capita surcharge for each income group multiplied by the number of individuals paying the Medicare levy but not the surcharge in each income group above $50,000.
Tax incidence
The reduction in tax liability accrues in the first instance to consumers of the subsidized commodity. However, the ultimate economic incidence of tax concessions will depend on the elasticities of supply and demand for the tax-preferred commodities. For example, a tax concession for private health insurance may simply allow funds to increase their premiums for the same amount, as has occurred in recent years.
Fiscal efficiency -'targeting' tax subsidies
Because tax expenditure programs are typically subject to less public scrutiny and fewer evaluation processes than Budget appropriations, distribution of their benefits is less transparent.
Tax deductions and rebates are often of least benefit to those on low incomes, producing an 'upside-down' distributional effect (Surrey and McDaniel 1985) . In some cases, this may be a useful design feature of the concession, for example to target high income earners for donations to charity (see Freebairn 1994) . In other cases it simply reflects the exercise of political influence and has little to do with efficiency in the use of public resources (Chesterman 1999) .
In this context, it is useful to again draw the distinction between the apparent and actual beneficiary of the tax concession, because the legal incidence may not be the same as the actual economic incidence. While the legal beneficiary of the health insurance rebate is the individual taxpayer or fund member, the government has promoted the health insurance rebate on the basis of helping the health insurance industry and organizations. Should the package of financial incentives for private health insurance permit an increase in the cost of private health fund premiums, the economic benefit is effectively captured by the funds and/or health service providers rather than fund members.
The data
Since 1986, the Commonwealth Treasury has produced an annual set of estimates of tax expenditures of the federal government published in its Tax Expenditures Statement (Commonwealth Treasury 1999) . Treasury estimates provide the basis for estimates of tax expenditures on health published by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW 2000) . 4 Official estimates of tax expenditures can be integrated with those by Butler and Smith (1992) for the period 1960-61 to 1988-89. All estimates are based on data from taxation statistics published annually by the Australian Taxation Office, derived from tax administrative processes.
5
The AIHW attributes funding for health services expenditures to the income year in which the qualifying expenditure was made, while the Tax Expenditures Statement attributes the cost of tax expenditures to the year in which the Budget revenue cost was incurred (on a 'cash' basis). AIHW estimates for net medical expenses are more accurate, as they remove other unrelated small rebates included in the Tax Expenditures Statement. The AIHW estimates are used in this study for the period 1989-90 to 1998-99. However, they are attributed to the financial year after the expenditure was made for comparability with the TES presentation.
Some features of the data warrant mention.
• The unit of income taxation in Australia is the individual, which is the unit presented in taxation statistics. However, the more usual unit for distributional analysis is the household.
• The coverage of taxation statistics can also vary over time with changes in the tax structure and exemption levels. Taxation statistics exclude income earners who are not required to lodge income tax returns. This is unlikely to have implications for the present analysis because all individuals benefiting from tax rebates are included in taxation statistics. However it does complicate comparisons of trends based on the distribution of household or family incomes.
• The estimates of the value of tax expenditures are based on data for 'taxable individuals', and thus exclude the value of rebates accruing to 'non-taxable' individuals. 'Non-taxable' individuals represent 5-6 per cent of the total taxpayers over the last two decades, and account for a similar, stable proportion of the value of rebates allowed in 1982-83 and 1997-98 . (Prior to that date, taxation statistics provide insufficient detail to assess effects of excluding non-taxable incomes.) Estimates based on data for taxable individuals could thus be expected to provide an accurate picture of trends for the total individual taxpayers for at least the last two decades.
• A significant number of high income earning individuals in the 1997-98 taxation statistics are recorded as receiving the income tested rebate that was in effect for the 1997-98 income year. Advice from the ATO is that threshold adjustments for taxpayers with several dependent children may allow access to the rebate by some high-income taxpayers with large families. Later auditing may also alter the statistics as originally published. Further research and comparison with 1998-99 taxation statistics is necessary to explain this surprising feature of official data.
Tax concessions for private health-related expenses
Income tax concessions for health related expenditures have taken three major forms in Australia (Butler and Smith 1992 ):
• deductions from taxable income, allowed until 1974-75 for net spending on medical services and expenditure on health insurance taken out with registered medical benefit funds; and 
Tax concession for health insurance -the Medicare levy surcharge exemption
The exemption from the 1 per cent Medicare levy surcharge which applies to individual taxpayers with taxable incomes above $50,000 p.a. (couples $100,000 p.a.) represents a tax concession benefiting private health insurance funds and/or their members. This tax benefit has not so far been included in the official estimates of tax expenditures in Australia (Commonwealth Treasury 1999). As discussed earlier, it is possible to estimate the value of this concession using 1997-98 income year tax statistics.
This study estimates the value of this concession for members of health insurance funds having taxable incomes above $50,000 to be around $1.1 billion in 1997-98. For more recent years, this amount will rise commensurate with any expansion of private health insurance fund membership since that time.
Taxation statistics for the 1998-99 income year will be published in November 2000. However, the tax concessions for private health insurance will expand substantially in 1999-2000 because of the jump in fund membership in June 2000.
Tax rebates and deductions for health-related expenses
Details of tax rebates and deductions applying to private health related expenditures since the early 1960s are set out in Table 1 below.
Changes from deductions to concessional rebates and the abolition of tax concessions for private health insurance were associated with broader tax reforms during the early 1970s and with the introduction of Medibank in 1975. Likewise, changes during the 1980s were associated with the introduction of Medicare in 1984, and with reforms to the income tax structure. 
Tax expenditures on health -the level and distribution
No previous study has analysed the distribution of these tax expenditures across taxpayer income groups, and no previous study has examined long-term trends in the equity of these tax concessions. Yet as is evident in Table 2 below, the amounts involved are substantial. 158,000 309,000 (a) 467,000 (a) excludes amounts paid out as direct subsidies to health insurance funds and counted as direct expenditures (having an approximate cost to the Budget of $252 million in 1997-98, and $782 million in 1998-99).
(f) Treasury forecast, (Commonwealth Treasury 1999).
Sources: For the period to 1988-89, see Butler and Smith (1992, p. 49) . For 1989-90 onwards, see AIHW (2000) and Commonwealth Treasury (1999).
The total cost of the private health insurance rebate also depends on any associated increases or decreases in tax expenditures for net medical expenses, and vice versa. As is evident from Figure 1 , the historical pattern has been for the revenue cost of tax concessions for net medical expenses rises with the cost of concessions for private health insurance. This suggests health fund membership is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, high net medical expenses. This implies that the revenue cost of the tax concession for private health insurance is understated if these relationships are not taken into account. Source: see Table 2 Bearing in mind the caveats about aggregating the value of tax expenditures for medical expenses and those for private health insurance (discussed in Section 2 above) the distribution of tax expenditures across taxpayer income groups is set out in Tables 3-5 It is evident from Figure 2 and Table 3 that the distribution of tax concessions for private health related spending of individuals is heavily skewed towards those with high incomes. Half of the value of tax expenditures on health-related private spending benefits taxpayers in the group with the highest third of taxable incomes. This high income earner share has increased since the early 1980s, after shrinking in the 1970s.
Figure 2 Distribution of tax expenditures on private health insurance by taxable income group, 1997-98 income year
The combined effect of the tax rebate for net medical expenses and the private health insurance tax rebate was to provide those with annual taxable incomes above $35,000 with tax subsidies of at least $126 million in 1998-99, arising from their 1997-98 tax assessment. Projected to 1999-2000, this distribution implies around $207 of tax subsidies for health related spending went to the most affluent third of taxpayers, with this amount rising even further to $234 by 2001-02 on Treasury's 1999 forecasts for these tax expenditures.
The distributional patterns are similar for net medical expenses and private health insurance:
• A minimum $95 million (46 per cent) of the $207 million tax rebate for private health insurance premiums for 1997-98 (impacting on the budget in 1998-99) went to around 250,000 high-income individuals with taxable incomes exceeding $35,000 pa;
• Around 56 per cent of the value of the rebate for net medical expenses accrued to the highest income third.
Just 18 per cent of the value of tax expenditures ($37 million) subsidised the private health fund membership of the bottom third taxable income group. These individuals had taxable incomes of less than around $20,000 pa. These estimates will probably underestimate the share of these tax expenditures accruing to the highest income earners because they exclude the $252 million rebate paid directly through health funds in the 1997-98 income year ($782 million in the 1998-99 income year), and are based on outdated Treasury forecasts predating the rise in fund membership in 2000. Direct payments would also disproportionately benefit high-income earners. 8 With current estimates of the total subsidy from the rebate for private health insurance ranging up to $2.4 billion (Segal 2000) , it would be expected based on tax rebate statistics that as much as $1.1 billion might accrue to those in the top third of taxable incomes. Around $280 million of this would subsidise the purchase of ancillaries insurance by this income group.
Estimates based on 1997-98 income year tax statistics also understates the proportion of the current private health insurance rebate claimed by high-income earners because the rebate was no longer subject to an income-tested from January 1999. While there are some concerns at the validity of the data, the official taxation statistics for 1997-98 suggest that in 1998-99 and subsequent years, the higher-income earner share of the rebate will be greater than 46 per cent because the rebate was not income tested from December 1998. Tables 3 to 5 that the tax deductions in the 1960s and early 1970s were even more skewed in favour of higher-income groups than the tax rebates allowed for health insurance and net medical expenses in the last two decades. For example, in 1982-83, around $263 million of the value of the tax rebate for private health insurance premiums (48 per cent) was paid annually to taxpayers with the top third of taxable incomes, compared to around 63-66 per cent during the 1960s and early 1970s. This is because deductions are of greatest value to those with the highest marginal tax rates, and during those decades, marginal income tax rates were around 66 per cent for high income earners.
It is also noteworthy in
Private health insurance and public funding
The package of reforms to encourage private health fund membership introduced by the Federal government in 1996 purportedly aimed to increase private funding of health care, reduce pressure on the public hospital system, and increase consumer choice. The Australian Health Insurance Association told a Senate inquiry the rich would subsidise the poor as a result of the new incentive scheme for private health insurance because the new system was about 'ensuring the rich add to health financing moneys' (Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee, 1998).
There has been a steady decline in fund membership since the early 1990s, with a slight recovery when the PHIIS and private health insurance rebate was introduced, and a strong rise associated with the deadline for the Life Time Health Cover Scheme from July 2000 (Figure 3 ).
Figure 3 Private health insurance coverage 1984 to 2000
Source: PHIAC (2000) However, available data on funding to mid-1999 shows tax and other incentives for health fund membership may reduce rather than increase the private share of national health services funding because of the increased government contribution through tax concessions.
Health services in Australia have historically been funded by a combination of the Commonwealth, State/local, and non-government sectors. On the face of it, the non-profit sector was a major player in financing health expenditures until recent years, when its predominant position was taken over by the Federal Government (Table 6 ). For example, in the early 1970s, before the introduction of Medibank, the non-government sector appears as the major player in financing health services expenditures. Likewise, in 1982-83 the non-government sector apparently financed just over 40 per cent of spending on health services in Australia. 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 at June 30
Persons, 000 (2000); Butler and Smith (1992) However, the presentation in Table 6 treats tax concessions granted by the Federal government as if they were 'non-government' financing of health services. This is misleading. In reality, these tax concessions represent government funding of health services.
The government/non-government pattern of funding of health services changes considerably if these tax expenditures are taken into account. Abolition of tax concessions for private health insurance when Medibank and Medicare were introduced helped offset the budgetary cost of those public health financing systems (Table 7 and Figure 4 ). In 1974-75, just before the introduction of Medibank, tax concessions for health-related private spending accounted for around 12 per cent of the total health services funding. By the time Medicare was introduced in 1984, tax expenditures represented around 5 per cent of health services funding.
This suggests the funding role of the non-profit sector is significantly less than apparent from unadjusted data such as that in Table 6 . The growth of Commonwealth funding due to the introduction of Medibank and Medicare is much less dramatic than it would seem from unadjusted data. For example, if the non-government and Commonwealth government share is adjusted to account for funding provided as tax concessions, the private sector share remains at around one third or less of total funding for the period since 1974-75 (Figure 4 ). 1974-75 1975-76 1982-83 1987-88 1988-89 1997-98 1998-99 Non government sector State/local Commonwealth Sources: see Table 7 It remains to be seen whether the recent rise in private health insurance coverage significantly changes the overall funding balance. Between 1997-98 and 1998-99 , the non-government share of funding for health services did not increase but rather declined from 30.9 per cent to 30.0 per cent as a result of the Federal government's substantial tax subsidies for private health insurance.
Similarly, while the lifetime rating system and greater publicity of the tax concessions increased health fund membership, the net effect on the non-government share of funding of health services depends on the fiscal impact of the associated tax concessions for fund membership. As noted early, the tax subsidy associated with fund membership of around 8 million is likely to be well above original Treasury forecasts.
Conclusion and policy implications
Taxation reform over the last decade has emphasized removing special concessions from the tax system in order to improve equity, economic efficiency, and transparency. The use of the tax system since 1997-98 to provide subsidies to the health insurance industry directly contradicts the thrust of the Government's tax reform agenda, as well as undermining the progressivity and effectiveness of the national health care financing system. The private health insurance industry now receives more budgetary assistance than provided to the mining, manufacturing and primary agricultural production industries combined (Duckett 1999) . The effect of this industry assistance scheme on the efficient allocation of resources requires urgent review.
This study is the first to examine the distribution of tax expenditures on health-related spending including the private health insurance rebate. One of the basic strengths of Australia's public health system is that universal access to free public hospitals and cover against specified medical costs has been financed substantially through progressive taxation. The present extent of public assistance to the health insurance industry including through tax concessions significantly distorts this progressive pattern of health care financing in Australia because it has an 'upside-down' distributional effect. The current rebate for private health insurance has a direct annual cost that is likely to be around $2 billion or more. This study shows based on taxation statistics that tax concessions for health remain heavily skewed towards the affluent. For 1997-98, the latest year for which taxation statistics are available:
• around a half of the value of tax concessions for private health insurance went to the most well off third of taxpayers; and
• less than a fifth of these concessions go to the third of individuals in the lowest taxable income group.
According to taxation statistics, the income-tested PHIIS rebate for health insurance was at least as regressive as the universal rebate existing in the early 1980s. The removal of the income test from January 1999 makes the current rebate even more inequitable. It is likely that well over a billion dollars of public money is underwriting the health care of Australia's richest individuals and families. Around a quarter of the tax subsidy may be spent on ancillary rather than hospital insurance.
This skewed distribution of incentives for private health insurance contrasts sharply with a wide range of evidence on the progressive distribution of direct public spending on health (Harding et al. 2000; Schofield 1998; Withers, Throsby and Johnston 1994 ).
This study also shows that assistance to the health insurance industry through the tax system has been severely understated. On conventional definitions of 'tax expenditures', the exemption from the 1 per cent Medicare levy surcharge for the insured should be included in official published estimates of tax expenditures. This study has shown that the exemption represents a tax expenditure of around $1.1 billion annually, a substantial additional tax prop to the health insurance industry that has attracted virtually no comment because of its lack of transparency and its omission from the Treasury's annual Tax Expenditures Statement. The use of Commonwealth taxation powers to impose a discriminatory tax on individuals choosing not to purchase a commercial product is questionable, setting a disturbing precedent for governments to impose discriminatory income taxes according to other dubious criteria.
Furthermore, based on past experience, the cost of the tax rebate for net medical expenses is likely to expand along with the rebate for private health insurance. On available statistics, subsidising private health insurance has little, if any benefit in the form of increasing non-government funds for health services.
One rationale put forward for the present policy of encouraging high-income earners to take out private health insurance is that they can afford to pay more for health care. Yet far from being a 'Robin Hood' policy, tax incentives for private health insurance feudalise public financing of health services by eroding the progressivity of taxation. Exempting the insured from the Medicare penalty and subsidizing their insurance premiums effectively absolves high-income earners, most of who are insured, from contributing appropriately to the community's health care costs. A more effective and equitable way to increase the contribution of the rich to health care costs would be to abolish the exemption from the Medicare levy surcharge and channel the revenues into the public health system.
While encouraging private health insurance membership is said to take pressure off public hospitals, there is compelling evidence that the cost of the private health insurance rebate far exceeds any financial gains to public hospitals (Segal 2000) . Shifting demand to the private hospital sector would save less than $1.3 billion annually, ignoring continued use of public hospitals by the privately insured. The research by Segal confirms previous work concluding that the private health insurance rebate is a very inefficient way of meeting the demand for hospital services (Duckett and Jackson 2000) .
Public assistance for the private health insurance industry is at the expense of public health care. Each year, the private health insurance rebate alone is drawing over $2 billion of government funding away from public health care provision. 9 Public sector cutbacks over the last decade have produced queues in public hospitals (Deeble 1999) and axing of public dental care services such as the Commonwealth Dental Health Program (Duckett and Agius 2000) . Yet through the rebate for private health insurance, the Federal government now provides a large public subsidy for high-income earners to jump hospital queues, obtain cosmetic surgery and dental care, and pay for their gym club membership. For example, through the 30 per cent rebate for ancillary insurance the Commonwealth is now spending around $180 million pa funding dental services mainly for the affluent (Duckett and Agius 2000) .
As well as undermining the progressive financing of universal health care, the scheme is an ineffective and wasteful way of funding health care:
• It discriminates against those who choose to self insure. While private health insurance adds $4.4 billion annually of non government funding for health care, around $7.6 billion of funding is contributed annually by individuals though self insurance (AIHW 2000, Tables A2 to A16 ).
• The administrative costs of private health insurance funds account for around 12 per cent of the value of premiums. This means that of every billion dollars of public subsidy, over $100 million is wasted on administration. By comparison, average income tax collection costs are around 1 per cent of revenues (Collins et al. 1988 ).
• Recent research shows demand for health insurance is relatively unresponsive to price (Butler 2000) . The price elasticity of demand for private health insurance is around -0.5 per cent, while demand for ancillary cover is even less price elastic. This suggests increasing membership through public subsidy of membership premiums is likely to be high cost and/or ineffective because it is not perceived as value for money.
• Most of the rebate is also paid to those with existing private health insurance rather than to new members. For example, if 60 per cent of high income earners are already health fund members, even a 20 per cent increase in membership due to the rebate still means around four fifths of the subsidy is a windfall to those who are already members (Richardson 1998 ).
Current financial incentives for middle and high-income earners to take out private health insurance and abandon Medicare are thus a drain on the public purse and threaten the progressive principle underpinning Australia's public health care system.
The private health insurance rebate should be abolished, particularly for ancillary insurance. By doing so, at least $2 billion of additional funding could be earmarked for improving access to medically-necessary hospital services, public dental and allied health programs.
Existing incentives for private health insurance also lack transparency because the extent and distribution of public assistance to the private health insurance industry and its clients is not properly documented in the Commonwealth government's financial publications.
The Medicare levy surcharge is an untapped opportunity for expanding a progressive funding base for health care. Extending the Medicare levy surcharge to all high-income earners would further expand available revenues system for the public health care by around $1 billion, and would at the same time enhance the progressivity of health care financing.
The Commonwealth Government has repeatedly affirmed its stated commitment to Medicare. However, its actions in support of the private health insurance industry belie its claims. While its objective is stated to be to preserve choice for health consumers, the Commonwealth government has effectively removed the option for middle and highincome earners to commit to the public health care system.
This will have profound long-term consequences. Medicare and public hospital care will increasingly become the preserve of the poor, akin to the manifestly inadequate United States' Medicaid system for that country's welfare recipients. It also opens the way for advocating the United States' system of employment-based health insurance, which is costly, provides patchy coverage, and is unfair to many ineligible unpaid, low paid and casual workers.
The evidence in this study on tax concessions for private health related spending shows there is a need for renewed public debate on 'choice' in Australian public health financing -on whether we should resource and improve an equitable and cost-restraining public health care system with its single national insurer through a progressive financing arrangement, or whether we should exploit the coercive powers of the public revenue system to support a wasteful and heavily subsidized private insurance system for financing health care that has been abandoned in nearly every developed country because of its rising costs and gross inequity.
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